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Abstract: Personalized advertisement has changed the
web. It lets websites monetize the content they offer.
The downside is the continuous collection of personal
information with significant threats to personal privacy.
In 2002, the European Union (EU) introduced a first
set of regulations on the use of online tracking tech-
nologies. It aimed, among other things, to make online
tracking mechanisms explicit to increase privacy aware-
ness among users.
Amended in 2009, the EU Directive mandates websites
to ask for informed consent before using any kind of
profiling technology, e.g., cookies. Since 2013, the ePri-
vacy Directive became mandatory, and each EU Mem-
ber State transposed it in national legislation. Since
then, most of European websites embed a “Cookie Bar”,
the most visible effect of the regulation.
In this paper, we run a large-scale measurement cam-
paign to check the current implementation status of the
EU cookie directive. For this, we use CookieCheck, a
simple tool to automatically verify legislation violations.
Results depict a shady picture: 49% of websites do not
respect the Directive and install profiling cookies before
any user’s consent is given.
Beside presenting a detailed picture, this paper casts
lights on the difficulty of legislator attempts to regu-
late the troubled marriage between ad-supported web
services and their users. In this picture, online privacy
seems to be continuously at stake, and it is hard to reach
transparency.
Keywords: Privacy, Web Tracking, Cookie Law, ePri-
vacy Directive.
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1 Introduction
When browsing the web, users encounter the so-called
“online trackers”. They build their business on the mas-
sive collection and brokerage of personal data. Used by
websites to monetize the content they offer via person-
alized advertisement, online tracking is perceived as a
threat to users’ privacy [43, 59]. To regulate the usage
of tracking technologies in the web, the EU Commis-
sion issued already in 2002 the ePrivacy Directive. It
includes one of the first and strictest regulations on the
usage of online tracking mechanisms [21]. As amended
in 2009 [22], it requires websites to ask “prior informed
consent for storage or for access to information stored
on a user’s terminal equipment”. In other words, a web-
site must ask the visitor to authorize the storage and
retrieval of data sent through cookies and similar track-
ing mechanisms before delivering and installing them.
Since 2013, the so-called “Cookie Law” provided by the
ePrivacy Directive has been adopted by EU Member
States (EU MSs). Since then, its implementation has
become evident to end-users because of the presence of
a “Cookie Bar” on most of websites. This bar informs
users about the presence of tracking mechanisms and
asks for their consent to the usage of them. The ePrivacy
Directive has impact also outside European boundaries,
as any web service having users in EU must be compli-
ant.
Despite the Directive has been in force for more
than four years, only a few studies aimed to understand
whether web services actually respect it. All these stud-
ies build on experiments conducted on a very small scale,
without properly quantifying the extent to which the
ePrivacy Directive is actually implemented. This is also
explained by the fact that, to the best of our knowl-
edge, there exists no scalable tool to automatically check
if a website violates the Directive with regard to the
use of cookies. In this paper, we design and use Cook-
ieCheck [3], a simple tool to automatically perform this
check. Given a website, CookieCheck visits it as a “new
user”, and analyses installed cookies. It then checks the
presence of cookies violating the ePrivacy Directive, i.e.,
the so-called profiling cookies, which, as defined in [12],
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are used by services to identify users, and could be in-
stalled only after user consent is obtained.
We use CookieCheck to conduct a large measure-
ment campaign in April 2017. Results are shady: 49%
of popular websites violate the ePrivacy Directive, with
some categories (e.g., “News and Media”) where viola-
tions top to 86%. This is an optimistic estimate, as the
definition of profiling cookie we use throughout this pa-
per is stringent and conservative.
The ePrivacy Directive has been already criticized
as a case of regulatory failure: it impairs user brows-
ing experience, becoming ineffective in increasing the
users’ awareness and in their privacy [26, 45, 51, 57].
Here, we show that the Directive is a failure from the
enforcement perspective too. This testifies the struggle
of legislators to regulate online privacy in a complex
ecosystem dominated by advertisers where web services
need to monetize the content they offer. Indeed, the new
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), entered
in to force in May 2018 with a significant media cov-
erage, is only marginally impacting website habits that
still leverage profiling cookies without user consent. As
of November 2018, no substantial change emerges, pos-
sibly because it is to early to measure the outcomes of
the new GDPR.
The contributions of this paper are:
(1)We present results obtained by running large scale ex-
periments on more than 35, 000 websites and show that
almost half of them violates the Directive with regard
to the use of cookies (even in its less strict interpreta-
tion). A considerable fraction of violations are caused
by online trackers managed by big players of the web
and aimed to support advertising services.
(2) We conduct further experiments to investigate the
behavior of websites under different scenarios, e.g., when
consent to the usage of cookies is given, or changing
browser settings and client location. The only major dif-
ference is an increase of tracking after consent is given.
(3) We deeply discuss the weak points of the ePrivacy
Directive and the reasons behind its failure. We identify
the critical points the new ePrivacy Regulation propos-
als [24, 32, 37] should discuss, and, in the perspective,
the difficulties of regulating the troubled marriage be-
tween ad-supported services and users’ privacy.
The whole dataset used throughout the paper is
available for download [2], and we offer CookieCheck as
free and open source [3]. We provide a running demon-
strator of CookieCheck available at [3] for everyone to
use and share its code at [4].
We truly believe the figures we present are useful to
policy-makers, web industry players and researchers in
the debate on how to monitor and enforce privacy poli-
cies on the web.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 summarizes the EU web privacy regulatory
framework. In Section 3 and Section 4, we describe the
measurement methodology and campaigns, respectively.
Section 5 presents the results. In Section 6, we sum-
marize the related work. Section 7 provides a thorough
description of the ePrivacy Directive, with particular at-
tention to the most controversial points, and, Section 8
discusses the ePrivacy Directive issues in light of the new
Proposals for the ePrivacy Regulation currently under
revision. Finally, Section 9 concludes the paper.
2 Overview of The European
Regulatory Framework
In this section, we give the reader a summary of the
current European legislation that governs the usage of
tracking technologies. We provide a thorough descrip-
tion of the regulatory framework on ePrivacy in Sec-
tion 7, in which we also analyze the most controversial
points. Readers who are not experts may read Section 7
in advance.
We focus on the European Union, as it provides a
strict regulatory framework with a broad territorial ap-
plication. The European regulation is contained in the
2002 ePrivacy Directive [21], updated in 2009 by the
Dir. 2009/136/EC [22]. In few words, it mandates that
websites obtain users’ informed consent before using any
kind of tracking technology. More precisely, the direc-
tive mandates that a website can store or gain access
to information on user’s device only if the user is pro-
vided with clear and comprehensive information, and
is offered the right to refuse such processing. Consent
must be acquired before proceeding. Being HTTP cook-
ies the most popular means to implement web track-
ing [10, 31, 49], it follows that they cannot be installed
on user’s device without prior consent. Exceptions hold,
for instance for the so called technical cookies which are
strictly required for the service, such as session cookies
used to implement e-commerce websites. In this work,
we focus on profiling cookies – i.e., cookies installed by
web trackers to identify users, that are clearly subject
to consent according to the ePrivacy Directive [21]. Sec-
tion 3 provides a definition for profiling cookie, that we
motivate later in Section 5.3, based on experimental re-
sults. A detailed description of which cookies must be
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subject to consent according to the current regulation
is provided in Section 7.2.
In short: The ePrivacy Directive specifies that the
usage of profiling cookies must be authorized by the user
using an opt-in mechanism, and the website must pro-
vide the user specific information about the privacy pol-
icy. As such, compliant websites typically implement an
“Accept Cookie Bar” which offers the user the possibility
of consenting cookies the first time the website is ac-
cessed.
3 Measurement Methodology
We aim to detect whether a website violates the require-
ments on the use of cookies contained in the ePrivacy
Directive. We assume a violation occurs if the website
installs, without prior user consent, any profiling cookie.
For this, in our experiments we do not provide any form
of consent to cookies.
We build on automatic browsing of web pages,
and use two different tools: CookieCheck [3], a custom
tool we engineer to provide scalability through exper-
iment parallelization, and WebPageTest [8] which en-
ables higher configurability.
CookieCheck is a scalable system based on Docker
technology and Google Chrome. It is lighter than Open-
WPM [30] which embeds many tests that are useless
to our purposes (tracking of Javascript calls, response
body content, etc.). Instead, CookieCheck is fast enough
to visit websites in a short amount of time, without
sacrificing accuracy. Its code can be downloaded at [4],
and a working demonstrator of the tool is accessible
online [3]. CookieCheck instruments Google Chrome to
visit a web page, and collects cookie-related statistics
using the Chrome DevTools Protocol [1]. Thanks to
Docker technology, CookieCheck provides a reliable and
lightweight means to isolate multiple browser instances
running in parallel.
WebPageTest from Google [8] is designed for flex-
ibility. It offers more configuration options than Cook-
ieCheck, but it is significantly slower and does not allow
parallel testing, thus considerably increasing the collec-
tion time. More precisely, WebPageTest allows us to se-
lect different language and locale settings and to emu-
late different browsers used on different devices (e.g., Sa-
fari on Apple iPhone or Firefox on Android). It does this
by changing the User-Agent HTTP header and screen
resolution. It also allows to define custom browser pro-
files to emulate past browsing activity by the user.
Both tools take as input a set of web pages, and visit
each. When the page is fully loaded (i.e., the OnLoad
event is triggered) or a 90s timeout fires, they dump to
file the HTTP Archive (HAR) [55], a JSON-formatted
structure that summarizes navigation data and reports
statistics about services and downloaded objects. For
each HTTP transaction, the HAR logs the headers of
the corresponding request/response. If not otherwise
specified, we take care of erasing the browser cache and
cookies stored before each visit. No user action is per-
formed on the page. Hence, we emulate the behavior of
a new user accessing the web page for the first time, and
not having provided any prior consent to the installation
of cookies. We do not scroll the page, nor click on any
link. As a consequence, we do not provide any form of
implied consent, allowed in some interpretations of the
ePrivacy Directive (see Section 7.2.2).
We next analyze the cookies installed at the end of
each visit:
1. We look at all HTTP responses with Set-Cookie
header in the HAR file.
2. We match the domain of the service installing the
cookie against the domain of the visited website to
identify third-party cookies.
3. We check if profiling cookies are installed. These are
cookies exclusively by third-party domains catego-
rized as advertising trackers by both Ghostery [41]
and Disconnect [27], two popular tracker-blockers.
We further tighten the classification by considering
only those cookies having a lifetime greater than
1 month. The robustness of our results to the em-
ployed tracker list will be discussed in Section 5.
4. At the end of this process, we tag a web page as vio-
lating the ePrivacy Directive if at least one profiling
cookie was installed.
The result is a conservative choice, since at step three we
detect a violation only for those cookies which are third-
party, have long lifetime, and are classified as privacy
offending by popular anti-tracker blacklist.
4 Measurement campaigns
We run two measurement campaigns, both conducted in
April 2017 at the premises of our University Campus in
Italy. The first campaign aims to check the presence of
profiling cookies at scale. The second investigates how
profiling cookies differ depending on device, browser set-
tings, location of client, and when prior consent has been
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given. At last, we analyze measurements collected peri-
odically during the last 4 years. Table 1 summarizes all
datasets.
To perform these measurements, we profit from a
Linux machine equipped with an Intel® Xeon CPU with
12 cores and 32GB RAM and connected to the Inter-
net through a 1Gb/s network. For the analysis we use
a Hadoop cluster running Apache Spark and Python,
whose Cookie module allows us to parse cookies.
4.1 Large scale measurement campaign
We rely on SimilarWeb [7], a website ranking service ana-
logue to Alexa to obtain per-country and per-category
website ranks. We pick the most popular websites in 25
countries (21 EU MSs, plus 4 non-EU countries).1 We
consider sites from 25 different categories. The list of
countries and categories can be deduced from Figure 5.
For each country and category, we pick the 100 most
popular websites. In total, we consider 25× 25× 100 en-
tries, corresponding to 35, 862 unique websites to visit
(as the lists overlap). In total we performed 179, 310 vis-
its (5 visits per website) using 24 CookieCheck instances
over a period of 15 days. We collected more than 195GB
of HAR files. Less than 5% of visits failed for timeout
intervention, likely due to websites being temporarily
offline or slow loading speed. In the remainder of the
paper we refer to this dataset with Large-Dataset.
4.2 Specific measurement campaigns
We employ WebPageTest to run experiments on the 100
most popular websites for three main European coun-
tries: France, Germany and Italy. In total we count 241
unique websites. We visit each of them, changing the
configuration of the tool, mimicking different browsers
and devices, and analyzing historical data.
4.2.1 Impact of giving consent to cookies
We want to evaluate the impact of providing consent to
the installation of cookies. To this end, we first manually
visit the homepage of each website in the list to give
consent to the usage of cookies (whenever the Cookie
1 SimilarWeb provides per-country ranks for 21 EU MSs out of
28.
Bar is offered). We save the resulting browser profile,
that we then use later on to visit websites again. This
lets us verify whether websites actually install profiling
cookies only upon user consent has been provided. We
refer to this dataset as AcceptCookie-Dataset.
4.2.2 Impact of different browsers
We want to investigate if the use of different browsers
may affect the number of installed cookies. For in-
stance, mobile devices typically download simpler pages
with less objects. We run tests using all browsers avail-
able within WebPageTest: Microsoft Internet Explorer,
Mozilla Firefox and Google Chrome, and we emulate mo-
bile browsers by changing both User-Agent and screen
resolution; we consider an Android smartphone, a tablet
of the Nexus series, an Apple iPhone6 and an iPad2. We
call this dataset Browser-Dataset.
4.2.3 Impact of client’s country
We want to study if and how websites change behavior
when visits come from different countries. To comply
with different local regulations, a website could react
differently and install different sets of cookies depend-
ing on the client location (as obtained from the client
IP address or language settings). To validate this hy-
pothesis, we use HTTP-proxies to change the client IP
address and country. For this experiment, we follow the
same approach employed in [50]. We use 9 proxies lo-
cated in 9 different countries (8 in Europe, one in the
USA), changing the locale settings accordingly. In this
case we use the desktop version of Google Chrome. We
refer to this dataset as Country-Dataset.
4.2.4 Impact of time
Finally, we want to analyze how the number of profil-
ing cookies varied over the past 4 years. As our mea-
surement campaigns started in 2017, we profit from a
publicly available dataset collected by the HttpArchive
team [5]. They used WebPageTest to visit to a large set
(>100 k) of websites every two weeks. The experiments
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Dataset Websites Size Experiment Goal
Large-Dataset 35, 862 195.5 GB Large-scale analysis varying country and category
AcceptCookie-Dataset 241 633 MB Analyzing the impact of giving consent to cookies
Browser-Dataset 241 2.2 GB Analyzing the impact of varying browser
Country-Dataset 241 2.9 GB Analyzing the impact of varying location
LongLasting-Dataset 241 15.1 GB Analyzing how situation changed over 4 years
Table 1. Description of datasets.
were performed by test servers located in USA.2 The
dataset is publicly available [6], and contains the HAR
files resulting from each visit. In this work, we use the
data collected from January 2015 to November 2018. All
the 241 websites in our specific measurement campaigns
are part of the HTTP Archive data. Even if such data
was not collected under our control, it has been collected
by WebPageTest. Manual inspection suggests a level of
reliability comparable to our testbed. Yet, HttpArchive
experiments lack of diversity in terms of measurement
location, employed browsers and website list. We refer
to this dataset as LongLasting-Dataset.
4.3 Limitations
Despite we followed the best practices in designing our
experiments, our methodology and measurement cam-
paigns are subject to limitations. We briefly discuss
them in the following.
• Our strict definition of profiling cookies might lead to
false negatives – i.e., we might incorrectly ignore situa-
tions in which violations happen. This is the case of sys-
tems exploiting advanced tracking mechanisms, such as
Flash cookies, or fingerprinting techniques. We may also
incur false positives if we incorrectly label a cookie as
profiling. However, our requirements (domain installing
cookie must appear in both Ghostery and Disconnect
tracker lists, and cookie must have a lifetime longer than
one month) make this case very unlikely. Furthermore,
websites typically set tens of offending cookies, mitigat-
ing the impact of isolated classification errors (see Sec-
tion 5.5 and Section 5.6).
• Considering the methodology, we adopt solutions de-
veloped in previous studies, as our goal is not to de-
sign new classification methodologies, but rather to thor-
oughly quantify violations.
2 As seen in Section 5.6, the location and country of the mea-
surement server do not affect the number of installed profiling
cookies.
• Considering data collection from smartphones
(Browser-Dataset campaign), changing user-agent and
screen size may be insufficient to emulate different
classes of devices. Indeed, installed cookies may vary
accordingly to inner peculiarities of browsers, devices,
or Javascript engines.
• At last, the choice of the top-100 websites per country
and category is not representative of overall services. For
this, we offer CookieCheck as a flexible tool that one can
use to check websites of interest.
5 Results
This section presents our results. We first look into how
popular third-party cookies are, and which are the third
parties installing them. Next, we investigate the features
we use for classifying profiling cookies, unveil their us-
age in Large-Dataset, and quantify the robustness of our
results. We investigate in details the impact of provid-
ing consent, and changing browser, device or country
on cookie usage. Finally, we show how violations varied
across the past 4 years.
5.1 Quantifying the usage of third-party
cookies at scale
We start by analyzing the usage of third-party cookies
across web pages before the user consent is obtained.
While this does not necessarily represent a violation of
the ePrivacy Directive in its strictest interpretation (see
Section 7.2.1), it helps quantifying the extent of the phe-
nomena. For this we leverage Large-Dataset.
First, we notice that on average 74% of websites
install third-party cookies. Even categories which one
may expect not to embed any advertising –“Law and
Government”– shows 39% of websites embedding third-
party cookies. Interestingly, Adult websites come second.
They likely offer little (or specializes) ads, thus install
fewer third-party cookies. On the opposite side, most of
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Fig. 1. Third-party services installing cookies in Large-Dataset
websites. Domains are ranked based on the number of websites
they cover. Notice the log-scale on both axes.
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Fig. 2. Rank of the 20 third-party services installing the largest
number of cookies in websites of Large-Dataset. Services are
ranked based on the fraction of websites they cover.
websites in “News and Media” install third-party cook-
ies (93% on average). This is no surprise as these web-
sites typically build on advertisements, as well as ana-
lytics services. In fact, the per-website average of third-
party cookies ranges from 2.64 for websites in “Law and
Government” category to 24.71 for “News and Media”.
If we consider per-country results, we observe a
rather uniform picture. Values span from 60% (Croatia)
to 80% (UK). Looking outside Europe, websites tend to
install more third-party cookies at the first visit, with
Russian (94%) and US (81%) websites on top. Details
can be found on Appendix.
Take away: On average 74% of websites install
cookies from third parties before any user consent. The
scenario is rather flat across countries, while we observe
substantial differences across website categories.
5.2 Third-party services installing cookies
In this section we dig into the ecosystem of third-party
services that install cookies. We start by plotting in Fig-
ure 1 the number of domains (intended as hostnames
extracted from URLs) of third parties installing cook-
ies in Large-Dataset websites. Third parties are ranked
based on the number of websites they are contained in.
As shown, the rank is long-tailed, with a total of 23, 305
third-party systems installing at least one cookie. The
most popular ones are present in thousands websites.
For instance, googleads.g.doubleclick.net installs its cook-
ies on more than 10,000 websites.
Let us then focus on the top-20 third-party services
installing cookies. Figure 2 reports percentage of web-
sites they cover. Domains not in bold correspond to sys-
tems that are found in both Ghostery’s and Disconnect’s
lists of trackers.3 Considering the whole rank, 12.1% of
them are labeled as trackers. We leverage Ghostery’s
website to collect further information, resumed in Ta-
ble 2. In particular, we show the name of the company
managing the domain, the country in which such com-
pany is established and a brief description of the service
activity. First, we observe that, according to Ghostery,
most prominent third parties installing cookies are de-
voted to behavioral advertising activities (A). The only
exception is www.facebook.com which belongs to “Social
Media” (B). Few offer services to end users (C), and all
of these share data with other third-party systems (D).
Second, 16 out of 20 are established in the US, where
laws regulating the usage of users’ personal data are
more permissive than in EU. Finally, about half of these
domains are managed by big players of the web.
Take away: Most pervasive third parties managed
by big players of the web are responsible for installing
cookies in tens of thousands of websites. The majority
of these is devoted to personalized advertising activities,
whose mother companies are established outside Europe.
5.3 Distinguishing profiling cookies
The scenario depicted above demonstrates that most of
websites popular among European users install third-
party cookies at the first visit, even before the user
is given the option to accept them. The most diffused
third-party cookies are from domains classified as adver-
tising trackers from popular tracker-blockers. However,
this is not conclusive to understand to what extent the
ePrivacy Directive’s principles are violated, as not all
third-party cookies are installed to track users. There-
fore, we detail in the following the methodology we use
to distinguish profiling cookies, i.e., those cookies used
for profiling and tracking users that violate the ePrivacy
Directive if installed before obtaining user consent.
3 We use the intersection of the two lists to reduce the probability
of misclassifying a third-party domain as a tracker.
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Third Party Company Company Country Description Pervasiveness
googleads.g.doubleclick.net Google DoubleClick US A,D 27.0 %
www.facebook.com Facebook US B,D 19.0 %
ib.adnxs.com AppNexus US A,D 15.6 %
cm.g.doubleclick.net Google DoubleClick US A,D 12.8 %
pixel.rubiconproject.com Rubicon US A,D 11.3 %
apis.google.com Google US C,D 10.7 %
sync.adaptv.advertising.com Advertising.com US A,D 10.6 %
match.adsrvr.org TradeDesk US A,D 9.9 %
sync.mathtag.com MediaMath US A,D 8.1 %
odr.mookie1.com Media Innovation Group US A,D 8.1 %
securepubads.g.doubleclick.net Google DoubleClick US A,D 8.0 %
dpm.demdex.net Adobe US A,D 7.8 %
tags.bluekai.com Oracle US A,D 7.7 %
www.youtube.com Google US C,D 7.7 %
x.bidswitch.net IPONWEB UK A,D 7.5 %
us-u.openx.net OpenX US A,D 7.4 %
server.adformdsp.net Adform Denmark A,D 7.2 %
rtb-csync.smartadserver.com SMART AdServer France A,D 6.7 %
track.adform.net Adform Denmark A,D 6.5 %
p.rfihub.com Rocket Fuel US A,D 6.3 %
Table 2. Details of the top 20 third-party services installing the largest number of cookies in websites of Large-Dataset. Description is
derived from Ghostery privacy tool [41]. A: Behavioral Advertising, B: Social Media, C: Offers page contents, D: Shares data with 3rd
parties.
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Fig. 3. Ghostery’s classification of the third-party cookies (in
terms of key-value pairs) in websites of Large-Dataset. Notice
the log-scale on the y-axis.
We leverage Ghostery’s and Disconnect’s lists of
trackers. We perform a first analysis looking at third-
party cookies encountered in Large-Dataset in terms of
unique key-value pairs contained in them, i.e., possibly
new values assigned for each “new” visit, and match
the corresponding domain in the Ghostery’s list. Re-
sults are shown in Figure 3. It details the category
of the third parties according to Ghostery classifica-
tion. For instance, more than 7M key-value pairs are
installed by services falling in the advertising trackers
category. Indeed, each time we encounter an advertis-
ing tracker, it sees us as a “new” customer. Hence,
it assigns us a new identification value. We manually
verify that keys that assume a very large number of
unique values are used for profiling. For example the
key “id” in the googleads.g.doubleclick.net cookie has
been set 46, 305 times, always with different values. Sim-
ilarly “anj” key from ib.adnxs.com and “rpx” key from
pixel.rubiconproject.com have been found respectively
109, 254 and 85, 737 times, each with a unique value.
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Fig. 4. Empirical distribution of lifetimes of third-party cookies in
Large-Dataset. Notice the log-scale on the x-axis.
We omit to report the results for Disconnect as they are
very similar.4
Next, out of all the domains classified as trackers by
the intersection of Ghostery and Disconnect, we restrict
our focus to only those appearing in the advertising cat-
egory. We adopt this approach for two reasons: First,
the high number of key-value pairs supports the intu-
ition that those third-party cookies are actually used
for profiling. Second, advertising trackers are known to
be the most pervasive and prone to threat users’ pri-
vacy [10, 49]. At the end, out of the total 2, 870 unique
entries in the union of the lists, we obtain 738 domains.
We want to make our definition of profiling cookie
even more stringent by considering cookie lifetime. A
similar approach was used by the authors of [31]. In-
4 Assessing the accuracy of the tracker lists provided by Ghostery
and Disconnect is out of the scope of this paper.
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Fig. 5. Per-country and per-category fractions of websites installing at least one profiling cookie. At the end of each row (column) it is
reported the country-(category-)wise average.
deed, cookies containing a far-in-time expiration date
are more likely to be used for tracking purposes. To de-
fine a threshold, we compute the cumulative distribution
of cookie lifetimes observed in Large-Dataset. Figure 4
shows the results. The solid line is calculated consider-
ing all third-party cookies, while the dashed one refers
only to those installed by advertising trackers present in
Ghostery’s and Disconnect’s lists intersection. As shown,
80% of third-party cookies last 1 month or more. The
two curves mostly overlap, showing that trackers seldom
use short-lived cookies. Based on this result, we add a
further condition to consider a cookie to be “profiling
cookie”: it must exhibit a lifetime equal or greater than
1 month.
Take away: We tag a cookie as profiling if in-
stalled by a third-party domain classified as an adver-
tising tracker by both Ghostery and Disconnect, and if
it exhibits a lifetime greater or equal than 1 month. We
use this definition in the following.
5.4 Assessing violations at scale
In this experiment we are interested in understanding
whether websites users violate the requirements of the
Directive on the use of profiling cookies. Leveraging the
definition of profiling cookie described above, we ana-
lyze their usage across web pages of Large-Dataset. We
offer a breakdown of this analysis for each country and
category. We report results in Figure 5, where each cell
details the fraction of websites that installed at least one
profiling cookie during any of the 5 visits. Each cell cos-
niders 100 websites. Each row refers to a country, and
each column to a category. The penultimate column (By
TLD) considers websites by country code top-level do-
main (e.g., only *.fr websites for France). The last col-
umn reports the country-wise average fraction; last row
reports the average across EU countries per each cate-
gory. Columns report the category-wise average fraction
for EU countries only, and are sorted based on the av-
erage number of installed profiling cookies. Despite our
definition of profiling cookies is very stringent, we ob-
serve the average number of websites using them is wor-
ryingly high: on average 49% of websites do (all in all
average in Figure 5). Recall those are installed without
prior user consent, thus violating the ePrivacy Directive.
These figures thus constitute a lower bound on the vi-
olation fractions. To provide a possibly upper bound,
we compute the fraction of websites installing any thidr-
party cookie. Details are in the Appendix. Here the over-
all violations top to 74%.
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Fig. 6. Fraction of websites violating the Directive when consider-
ing profiling cookies installed by the N most pervasive trackers.
Recalling that our measurements neglect cookies in-
stalled via Javascript code and other tracking mech-
anisms, the overall picture is startling. Even the cat-
egory with the lowest fraction of non-compliant web-
sites –“Law and Government”– shows 14% of violations,
that grows to 38% considering all websites installing
third-party cookies. This is due to the presence of ad-
supported websites beside institutional portals. Web-
sites in “News and Media” get the largest fractions with
86% (92%) of violations on average. This is no surprise
as these websites typically offer lots of advertisements,
which install their cookies to profile users without any
consent.
Focusing on profiling cookies per-country results,
EU countries show very similar results. Values span
from 44% (Slovakia and the Netherlands) to 58% (UK).
It worths remarking that the ePrivacy Directive had a
positive effect in the Netherlands which transposed the
Directive rather strictly: we record 63% of violations in
“News and Media” –the lowest for this category– and
44% of violations in general. Looking outside Europe,
websites tend to install more profiling cookies at the first
visit, with Russian (83%) and US (62%) websites be-
ing negative examples. This demonstrates the ePrivacy
Directive is having some positive effect if compared to
countries with weaker or no regulatory frameworks such
as US and Russia.
Finally, we consider websites separately per country
code top-level domain (By TLD column). As such, the
resulting lists never overlap, allowing an analysis not bi-
ased by the popularity of transnational portals (social
networks, search engines, etc.). The overall considera-
tions still hold, with a slightly higher variability among
countries.
To complement above results, we investigate to
what extent our results are robust to the employed
tracker list. We run other experiments aiming at under-
standing how violation fraction varies when we change
the list of considered trackers. In particular, we con-
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Fig. 7. Per-website number of profiling cookies installed before
and after giving consent.
Country Banner No BannerNo Refresh Refresh No Cookie But Cookies
France 69 2 11 18
Germany 31 0 18 51
Italy 53 14 15 18
Table 3. Number of websites showing the Cookie Bar, and re-
freshing the page once user consent is given.
sider the top-N most popular third-party trackers. In
Figure 6 we report the fraction of websites that use pro-
filing cookies while we increase the number of consid-
ered trackers. If we consider the most pervasive tracker
alone, googleads.g.doubleclick.net, we obtain an overall
fraction of violations equal to 22%. The number gets
close to 40% if we consider the top 10 trackers. Clearly,
this number saturates to 49% (the all in all average in
Figure 5) when we consider all trackers.
Take away: A clear trend emerges: 49% of websites
popular among European users violate the ePrivacy Di-
rective as they embed profiling cookies installed by third-
party trackers without any prior user consent. Most pop-
ular trackers are responsible for the large fraction of vio-
lations. In particular, one of the main advertising track-
ers is managed by Google, and causes websites to violate
the ePrivacy Directive on more than 20% of cases.
5.5 Installed cookies upon consent
To respect the Directive websites must ask for consent
to install cookies by means of a button embedded in
a Cookie Bar, as explained in [13]. When clicked, the
website refreshes (or updates) the page to deliver new
and enriched content with new objects that trigger the
installation of cookies.
We consider the AcceptCookie-Dataset, and count
the websites which lawfully implement this procedure.
We consider three main EU countries, namely, Germany,
France and Italy which transposed the ePrivacy Direc-
tive into their regulations and exhibit the same fractions
4 Years of EU Cookie Law: Results and Lessons Learned 10
0
 1
 10
 100
IE Firefox
Chrome
Android-Tablet
iPad2
Android-Phone
iPhone6
Desktop Mobile
Pr
of
ili
ng
Co
ok
ie
s
User Agent
Italy France Germany
Fig. 8. Number of profiling cookies set with different browsers
and devices. Notice the log-scale on the y-axis.
of violations in Figure 5. As reported in Table 3, we ob-
serve that dozens of websites in AcceptCookie-Dataset
do not even provide a Cookie Bar, but regularly set
profiling cookies! In particular, in Germany more than
a half of websites do. Overall, 67 out of 241 websites
in AcceptCookie-Dataset do not provide a Cookie Bar
but set profiling cookies. Considering country ranks, in
France and Italy, 71 and 67 out of 100 websites em-
bed a Cookie Bar, respectively. For Germany, only 31
websites do that. Furthermore, the Cookie Bar consent
button triggers a page refresh in only 14 cases for Italian
websites, just in 2 cases for French, and in no cases for
German.
We consider the same 241 websites to count the
number of profiling cookies which are installed before
and after we provide consent. We report results in Fig-
ure 7, where websites are sorted by the number of profil-
ing cookies installed before consent (green line). To this
baseline we then sum new cookies installed after consent
has been given (red dots). As shown, only 43 websites
do not install profiling cookies before obtaining consent.
Among those, 34 never install cookies, while 11 correctly
wait for user consent before installing them. All other
websites, i.e., 80.5% install profiling cookies before con-
sent, and possibly install more after that.
Take away: 67 out of 241 websites do not provide
a Cookie Bar to let users provide consent, but install
some profiling cookies anyway. Among the remaining
ones, only 7% wait for user’s consent before installing
profiling cookies.
5.6 Impact of device and location
We study Browser-Dataset dataset to check whether in-
stalled profiling cookies vary when changing browser,
device, or country.
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Fig. 9. Fraction of websites violating the Directive when changing
user location. No significant difference is observed.
Figure 8 reports the number of installed profiling
cookies when using different browsers and devices, sep-
arately for Italian, French and German websites. Box
plots span from the 1st to the 3rd quartile, while
whiskers report the 10th and the 90th percentiles; black
strokes represent the median. A quite large amount of
profiling cookies is installed independently on the kind
of browser or device, and the number only slightly de-
creases for mobiles. This is likely due to the simpler
structure of pages served to mobile devices. Looking at
considered countries, German websites install more pro-
filing cookies than French and Italian, respectively.
Finally, considering the Country-Dataset, we visit
websites from 9 countries (Finland, France, Germany,
Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and US).
We employ 8 proxies (in addition to the client in our
country). Figure 9 shows the results. The number of
profiling cookies does not change, as well as the fraction
of websites violating the ePrivacy Directive. Figure 9
clearly shows that violations occur in ≈ 60% of cases for
whichever location. We conclude that websites do not
adapt the set of profiling cookies to install if the country
of the visitor implements the Directive in a different way.
Take away: The set of profiling cookies installed by
websites before users’ consent is the same independently
from the client’s browser or device. Also, user location
does not change the picture, even when outside EU.
5.7 A view over the last 4 years
In this section, we investigate how the scenario evolved
over the last years. We use the LongLasting-Dataset to
study how the fraction of violating websites varied from
2015 to 2018. As done for previous experiments, we tag
websites violating the ePrivacy Directive whenever they
install at least one profiling cookie without obtaining
prior consent. For this analysis we consider data col-
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Fig. 10. Fraction of websites violating the Directive over 4 years.
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Fig. 11. Profiling cookies for two websites over the last 4 years.
Each line represents the presence/absence of a particular cookie.
lected from January 2015 to November 2018. Results
are reported in Figure 10, separately for Italy, France
and Germany. The picture depicts a quite flat scenario,
and values fall in [52-63]% range. For Italy, we observe a
small decrease around May 2015, time at which the Ital-
ian Data Protection Authority issued a new regulation
that establishes sanctions for ePrivacy Directive viola-
tions [39, 40]. The entry into force of the new GDPR
in May 2018 (highlighted in gray in the figure) seems
to not generate changes yet, even if we observe a neg-
ative trend in France. The overall fraction of violating
websites was 57% in January 2015 and stands at 56% in
November 2018.5 We conclude that all in all the picture
is rather consistent, and the ePrivacy Directive has not
diminished users’ exposure to tracking technologies in
the last four years.
5 Such values do not match the ones of Figure 5 as considered
websites are different.
We complement the above result with two exam-
ples of common behavior. Figure 11 shows the profiling
cookies installed by two news websites for the entire du-
ration of the LongLasting-Dataset. The figure reports
measurements collected every two weeks from 2015 to
2018. The x-axis represents time, while the y represents
a specific profiling cookie found in the dataset. The pres-
ence of a red point indicates that such cookie was in-
stalled at that time. Looking at www.tf1.fr in Figure 11a,
we notice that dozens of profiling cookies are regularly
installed before consent. Occasionally other cookies ap-
pear, due to the dynamicity of the ecosystem related
with advertisement. A different consideration holds for
www.repubblica.it in Figure 11b. Up to 9 different pro-
filing cookies were regularly installed in the first half of
2015. Starting from June 2015, the number drops to one.
This can be explained by the new national regulation en-
tered into force in May 2015. Since that date, the web-
site has introduced a new Cookie Bar, and removed all
profiling cookies but one.6 The profiling cookie that still
appears after June 2015 belongs to imrworldwide.com a
well-known tracking platform. Understanding why this
profiling cookie keeps being installed is out of the scope
of this study.
Take away: The overall fraction of violating web-
sites is constant over the last 4 years, and demonstrates
that the ePrivacy Directive did not reach the goal of di-
minishing users’ exposure to tracking technologies over
the last years.
6 Related Work
To the best of our knowledge, few works specifically ad-
dress the problem of understanding whether the ePri-
vacy Directive is respected by websites. Leenes et al. [46]
focused their study on 100 Dutch websites manually vis-
ited and observed that most of them do not respect
the ePrivacy Directive. Borghi et al. [17] targeted 200
UK websites, concluding that violations are present in
84% of cases. In another study, Carpineto et al. [18]
analyzed Italian Public Administration websites, and
claimed that violations of the ePrivacy Directive occur
in 6.6% of cases. Similar observations emerged as a side
effect of our previous work about tracker-blocker effec-
tiveness [58]. However, none of the previous works builds
6 Once obtained the user’s consent, the page is reloaded and
other cookies get installed.
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on a dataset large enough to achieve solid conclusions.
Here we are the first to build a methodology to address
this problem at scale. We present results obtained from
hundreds of thousands of visits, and present statistically
robust observations.
Related to the usage of cookies in the wild, it worths
mentioning Gonzales et al. [42]. Their work presents a
large-scale characterization of cookies derived from traf-
fic traces. Some of presented findings are tangent to
this work: Gonzales et al. show that some trackers, e.g.,
krxd.net, use the cookie name to concatenate various
user information, making the number of unique identi-
fiers associated to a user explode. However, our results
(Figure 3) are not affected, as we observe a bunch of
trackers actually encapsulating very dynamic informa-
tion in the cookie name, but these are not sufficient to
introduce any bias in results. Another prominent work
related to ours is [30] from Englehardt et al. They ad-
dressed the problem of characterizing online tracking on
very large number of websites. The dataset authors col-
lect contains the same information we build upon to un-
derstand if a website violates the ePrivacy Directive, but
they did not consider that the “first visit” may be differ-
ent due to regulations in place. Other works [10, 31, 49]
study how cookies are used as identifiers by trackers,
and may expose sensitive information to eventual eaves-
droppers [19]. Englehardt et al. [31] observe that cook-
ies alone are enough to reconstruct up to 73% of users’
browsing history, while, similarly to what we observe,
Li et al. [49] find that 30% of Alexa top 10,000 websites
use one of the top 5 most pervasive trackers. Finally,
other recent studies [15, 54] show that users are contin-
uously tracked when online, and tracking technologies
have evolved dramatically beyond cookies: HTML5 Lo-
cal Storage, Etags, Flash and fingerprinting [10, 28, 60].
Trackers are widespread even in commercial emails via
similar methods such as embedded pixels [29].
Regarding the Cookie Law, some other works stud-
ied it from a legal perspective [20, 45, 47, 51]. All con-
cluded that this is a case of regulatory failure. Koops [45]
argues that the Directive creates the illusion that indi-
viduals have control over their data, and it is difficult
for webmasters to respect it. Differently, Markou [51]
pinpoints that the cause of the failure lies in resistance
of advertisement ecosystem and in the lack of privacy
awareness among users. A similar remark is made by
Cofone [20]. Leenes et al [47] highlight four “different
flavours” of the cookies regulatory failure: (i) the opt-
out failure; (ii) the coexistence of different national im-
plementations of the ePrivacy Directive; (iii) the lack
of interest and attention of users and general public;
(iv) the lack of a concrete enforcement. As a result,
the cookie legal saga shows the difficulty of the Euro-
pean legislator in managing the complex scenario offered
by tracking technology advertising industries’ business
models, users’ rights to privacy and confidentiality, and
regulatory bodies. Our study does not focus on the le-
gal reasons of the failure, but quantifies it by showing
technical evidences.
7 Background
In this section we first describe the cookie technology
in the context of online tracking. Then, we introduce
the European regulatory framework that governs the
usage of cookies. For the latter, we involved experts in
regulations to detail the possible interpretations of the
law.
7.1 HTTP cookies as tracking technology
HTTP cookies are used to preserve state of HTTP trans-
actions in web browsers, and have been standardized
in IETF’s RFC 6265 [16]. A cookie is defined as a set
of {name=value} pairs. It may have attributes such as
expires=date, path=path, domain=domain_name, secure . To
set a cookie, a server can either use the Set-Cookie
header in HTTP responses, or use Javascript to write
entries. Once a cookie is stored, the browser includes it
in the header of each HTTP request headed to servers
belonging exclusively to domain domain_name with path
path until date expires.
When a user visits some web page W1, hosted by
domain D1, the browser typically initiates HTTP trans-
actions to fetch URLs U2, ..., Un contained in the page,
to, e.g., get images, css, js files, etc. Some of these ob-
jects may be served by other domains D2, ..., Dn. We
refer to the cookie installed by D1, i.e., the domain the
user intentionally visited, as a first-party cookie. Any of
the cookies installed by D2, ..., Dn are third-party. The
cookies employed to track users belong to this second
family as typically the tracker domain Di is different
from D1.
Also expiration time makes cookies different. Ses-
sion cookies are temporary, i.e., deleted when the user
closes the browser or after a short period of time. Per-
sistent cookies contain an explicit expiration date and
may stay stored in the browser for long time.
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Third-party persistent cookies are the most promi-
nent means used by trackers to reconstruct users’ habits
trajectories and compute per-user profiles which are em-
ployed to, e.g., deliver personalized advertisement [31].
As these threaten users’ privacy, policymakers under-
took initiatives to regulate their usage.
In this paper we focus on cookies installed by well-
known trackers that use persistent profiling cookies.
7.2 The current European regulatory
framework for web privacy
At the international level, no comprehensive regulatory
framework exists concerning web privacy, and each coun-
try eventually provides its own [52]. In this paper we
focus on the European scenario, which is considered to
have one of the most comprehensive frameworks (along-
side with the Canadian and the Swiss ones) for the reg-
ulation of personal data collection and usage in web
communications. Three motivations move our choice: i)
it provides strict rules on tracking; ii) it has broad ter-
ritorial application; iii) it is currently being updated.
The first European regulation on web tracking was
introduced in 2002 by Dir-2002/58/EC on privacy and
electronic communications [21]. Article 5(3) prescribed
two conditions for “the use of electronic communications
networks to store information or to gain access to infor-
mation stored in the terminal equipment of a subscriber
or user”: i) “the subscriber or user concerned is provided
with clear and comprehensive information” pursuing the
Directive 95/46/EC principles; and ii) “is offered the
right to refuse such processing by the data controller”.
This Directive has been amended in 2009 [22]. Ac-
cording to its last version, Article 5(3) explicitly disci-
plines the conditions for the use of any tracking “de-
vices” (e.g., cookies, supercookies, fingerprinting, snip-
pets, etc.), moving from the necessity of the user’s con-
sent. It “is only allowed on condition that the subscriber
or user concerned has given consent, having been pro-
vided with clear and comprehensive information, in ac-
cordance with Directive 95/46/EC, inter alia, about the
purposes of the processing”. The European legislator re-
jected the opt-out mechanism for the opt-in one, pre-
scribing the necessity of the user’s prior informed con-
sent before using any tracking technology.
The Opinion 15/2011 on the definition of con-
sent [11] of the Article 29 Data Protection Working
Party (Art. 29 WP) clarifies how to manage the pre-
scription of the user’s informed consent.7 It details the
consent procedure, stating that “consent based on the
lack of individuals’ action [...] does not meet the require-
ments of valid consent under the Directive 95/46/EC”.
Thus, “browser settings which would accept by default
the targeting of the user (through the use of cookies)”
are not possible. It fails “to meet in particular the re-
quirements for an unambiguous indication of wishes. It
is essential that the data subject is given the opportu-
nity to make a decision and to express it, for instance
by ticking the box himself, in view of the purpose of the
data processing”. In 2013 [13], Art. 29 WP went further
providing guidance on obtaining consent for cookies and
lists four requirements to be jointly fulfilled: i) specific
information must be provided; ii) consent has to be ob-
tained before the cookies’ setting; iii) the consent should
express an active choice; iv) the consent should be freely
given exercising a real choice.
It follows that the websites have to offer i) a short
resume of the privacy policy to the user, ii) a link to
the page containing all details, and iii) an interactive
element to ask users’ consent to install tracking devices.
All this information is typically provided in an “Accept
Cookie Bar” which is offered to the user the first time
she visits the website.
7.2.1 Cookies subject to prior consent
Dir-2002/58/EC defines two exceptions to the informed
consent principle: technical storage or access to infor-
mation is allowed “for the sole purpose of carrying out
the transmission of a communication over an electronic
communications network, or as strictly necessary in or-
der for the provider of an information society service
explicitly requested by the subscriber or user to provide
the service”. In the Opinion 04/2012 on Cookie Consent
Exemption [12] the Art. 29 WP explicitly clarifies which
kinds of cookies are exempted from the requirement of
informed consent: session cookies, and cookies that are
essential to provide the service are exempted (e.g., to
handle a cart in an e-commerce website). Informed con-
sent is required for all the others. The document explic-
itly observes that third-party persistent cookies are not
7 Art. 29 WP is an EU advisory body set out in Art. 29 of
Dir-1995/46/EC (Data Protection Directive). Opinions are docu-
ments which help practitioners and players interpret, understand
and apply the content of directives.
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Interpretation Subject to consent
A
B
C
D
E
Type of cookie First-party Technicalthird-party
Non-technical
third-party Profiling
Examples
Authentication,
user-input
memory, security
Multimedia player
settings, load
balancing
Social plug-ins,
performance
analytics
Behavioral
advertising,
tracking services
Table 4. Cookies subject to consent in different interpretations of the ePrivacy Directive. We verify violations according to (B).
essential and, thus, not exempted. This is the case of
profiling cookies.
However, such guidelines are not part of the ePri-
vacy Directive. Hence, the definition of a “necessary el-
ement” to offer a service is subject to interpretation by
National Data Protection Authorities. We illustrate dif-
ferent approaches in Table 4, based on different defini-
tions of necessary cookie. Helped by Opinion 04/2012,
we identify four types of cookies, represented as columns
in the table. Starting from the left, they are sorted from
the most to the least likely to be necessary. Indeed,
first-party cookies are very likely to be necessary (e.g.,
for authentication), while profiling cookies, installed by
e.g., behavioral advertising platforms, are very far from
being essential. We then formalize five different inter-
pretations of the ePrivacy Directive that differ in the
type of cookies subject to consent. The most permissive
approach (A) represents the extreme scenario where no
cookie is subject to consent, that clearly breaks the spirit
of the Directive. On the opposite side, the approach (E)
represents the strictest interpretation, which mandates
that all cookies need prior consent. In this work, we ver-
ify the compliance to the interpretation (B), which is the
most tolerant approach that mandates consent for some
kind of unnecessary cookies. According to (B), only pro-
filing cookies need prior users’s consent, while all others
do not. Thus, our definition of violations becomes very
conservative – i.e., we prefer to neglect some violations,
than to incur false positives.
7.2.2 Transposition into national legislation
The European regulatory landscape is not homogeneous.
All EU MSs must transpose EU Directives into their leg-
islation as a minimum level of harmonization. As such,
EU MSs have transposed the ePrivacy Directive in dif-
Fig. 12. ePrivacy Directive transposition into EU MSs legislation.
ferent ways [44, 56]. For the sake of simplification, we
group such transpositions into three categories. A graph-
ical representation of ePrivacy Directive interpretations
(and EU MSs of application) is provided in Figure 12.
(i) The strictest category prescribes the opt-in mecha-
nism – i.e., the user must provide consent. The consent
must be obtained before cookies are used. This interpre-
tation is in force in 11 EU MSs.
(ii) More flexible interpretations allow the consent to be
implied – i.e., inferred from the behavior of the user. In
other words, consent can be conveyed by clicking a link
or scrolling through a website. In 9 MSs, regulations
allow implied consent.
(iii) Tolerant interpretations of the ePrivacy Directive do
not require consent. The website must show a Cookie
Bar warning users about the use of cookies, that can
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be installed without any prior consent. Websites must
provide an opt-out mechanism to let users get rid of
cookies. Legislations of this kind are in force in 7 MSs.
In this work, we embrace the first two interpretations.
The ePrivacy Directive and Art. 29 WP Opinions con-
tain explicit references to the opt-in mechanism, and we
believe categories (i) and (ii) adhere more properly to
the spirit of the Directive. In other words, websites in-
stalling cookies without prior consent (even if implied)
are considered violating the ePrivacy Directive in the
paper. Experiments in this paper are performed from
Italy, that implements the opt-in mechanism.
Finally, the ePrivacy Directive does not sketch
procedures to guide the enforcement of its principles,
nor provides guidelines to perform proper audits. De-
spite Recital 66 of Dir-2009/136/EC amending Dir-
2002/58/EC disposes that “The enforcement of these
requirements should be made more effective by way of
enhanced powers granted to the relevant National Au-
thorities”, this point has been largely ignored.
8 Discussion
In this section we present the reasons we identify be-
hind the problematic issues of the ePrivacy Directive,
and add some considerations on the new e Privacy Reg-
ulation proposals.
8.1 Reasons behind the failure of the
ePrivacy Directive
Our results demonstrate that a large fraction of websites
ignores the ePrivacy Directive. We identify three main
reasons behind this:
(i) The Directive does not offer guidelines to perform
systematic auditing procedures with a coordinated su-
pervision. Two official reports from independent third
parties confirm this [26, 57]. In particular, Deloitte [26]
emphasizes that enforcement of rules is “insufficient and
inconsistent”, as currently in charge of each EU MS’s
Authority which “tend to audit in cases where there is
a specific risk or complaint by an individual. Ex-officio
audits remain a minority.”
(ii) The lack of automatic tools which can verify whether
a website violates the Directive makes it possibly com-
plicated for the deputed agencies to plan systematic au-
dits.
(iii) Users’ consciousness of their online privacy is still
too low. EU promulgated the ePrivacy Directive without
accompanying proper awareness campaigns aiming at
educating users about how their privacy is threaten un-
der the surface of the web. Regarding this, the EU body
Regulatory Fitness and Performance (REFIT), which is
in charge of verifying effectiveness of directives, states
the current rules end being counter-productive as “the
constant stream of cookie pop-up-boxes that users are
faced with completely eclipses the general goal of pri-
vacy protection as the result is that users blindly accept
cookies” [53].
8.2 The new Proposal for the ePrivacy
Regulation
In January 2017 a Proposal for the ePrivacy Regulation
which repeals the ePrivacy Directive [32] was published
by the European Commission. Hopefully, it will change
positively the current scenario. After a long review pro-
cess that involved stakeholders such as providers, regula-
tory bodies, citizens’ associations [14, 33, 35, 38, 48], the
Proposal entered the EU approval procedure. In Octo-
ber 2017 and in September 2018, the EU Parliament [37]
and the EU Council [24] proposed two new revised texts,
respectively.
The proposed Regulation, as announced by the EU
Digital Single Market Strategy [9], will integrate the pri-
vacy regulatory framework and shall be read in close
connection with the new General Data Protection Reg-
ulation which entered into force in May 2018 in all EU
MSs [23], as part of the same EU strategy. Among its
objectives, it will draw the new rules on cookies and
a more effective enforcement mechanism for such rules.
Moreover, the proposed Regulation will also extend the
territorial scope of the safeguards for the protection of
the confidentiality to electronic communication services
from outside the European Union to end-users inside.
Both the EU Commission and the Parliament
stressed the importance of the privacy-by-default prin-
ciple in designing websites, giving users a free choice on
the use of tracking devices and techniques. This point
was emphasised by the European Data Protection Su-
pervisor (EDPS) who invites the legislators to ensure
that consent will be genuinely freely given with no prej-
udice to the access and fruition of web services [34, 35],
and by the European Data Protection Board (EDPB)
in its Statement on the ePrivacy Regulation [36] pub-
lished on May 2018. The EDPB also recommended that
“In order for consent to be freely given as required by
the GDPR, access to services and functionalities must
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not be made conditional on the consent of a user to the
processing of personal data or the processing of informa-
tion related to or processed by the terminal equipment
of end-users, meaning that cookie walls should be ex-
plicitly prohibited”.
Notwithstanding, the EU Council proposed to re-
vise again how to design websites privacy settings on
cookies [25]. This said, as far as November 2018, the
revision process is far from being closed.
8.3 Unsolved issues
The new Proposal for the ePrivacy Regulation will
surely improve current scenario. However, it will have
to face the same difficult problem addressed by the ePri-
vacy Directive, i.e., regulating the troubled marriage be-
tween ad-fueled web services willing to monetize their
content and users desirous of preserving their privacy. In
such a complex ecosystem, dominated by the interests
of advertisers, we believe issues (i) and (ii) of Section 8.1
will be key to avoid another failure. Indeed, we advocate
EU will subsidize the development of automatic and
scalable auditing instruments and require Data Protec-
tion Authorities to perform systematic and regular audit
campaigns to verify the enforcement of the new Regula-
tion. In this context, we believe tools like CookieCheck
are extremely valuable. Moreover, they may help in fos-
tering the principle of transparency of the data process-
ing.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we run large-scale measurement cam-
paigns and testify that a wide fraction of websites does
not respect the the Cookie Law set up by the ePrivacy
Directive, with a few popular third parties causing such
violations. To this end, we designed CookieCheck, a sim-
ple tool to audit whether a website violates the ePrivacy
Directive. It is available online [3], along with its source
code [4]. We also share the datasets collected for this
study [2].
Apart from being helpful for increasing users’ on-
line privacy awareness, the results, as well as the tools
and discussion provided with this study, are useful for
researchers, policymakers and players of the web indus-
try in the debate on how to monitor and enforce privacy
policies on the web.
Considering the research community, we are among
the first to face the verification of privacy regulations,
and we hope the effort in producing tools for auditing
privacy violations will increase and get momentum.
Finally, we are improving CookieCheck to include
further checks, and we are contacting local Data Pro-
tection Authority to present our findings, hoping this
will lead to a first step to find a remedy to the shady
scenario depicted by our results.
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Appendix - Results with a less
conservative definition of profiling cookie
In this paper, we employ a strict definition of profiling
cookies. They are those installed by behavioral adver-
tising platforms, and with a lifetime higher than one
month. If results presented in subsection 5.4 provide a
lower bound for ePrivacy Directive violations, here we
want to provide a higher bound, relaxing our definition
of profiling cookie.
Here, we consider violating the ePrivacy Directive
those websites that install at least one third-party
cookie when accessed the first time, regardless the life-
time and nature. The above figure shows violations
across countries and website categories, and is identi-
cal to Figure 5 except for the more relaxed definition
of profiling cookie. Overall violations grow from 46% to
74%, and the increase is rather uniform across rows and
columns.
